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ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A"

ASPECTS OF PROSPECTIVE U.S. OVERSEAS  
BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

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BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

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ANNEX "C" TO APPENDIX "A"

ASPECTS OF PROSPECTIVE U.S. OVERSEAS  
BASE REQUIREMENTS, 1964-1967

PURPOSE

1. To outline the relationship of overseas bases to U.S. military capabilities and, with particular reference to strategic offensive weapons, estimate the utility of such bases in the 1964 to 1967 time frame.

SCOPE

2. The present U.S. overseas base system is described in summary form to indicate the purposes for which the United States uses military facilities provided by other nations of the Free World.

3. Future U.S. overseas base requirements are then discussed in the context of the anticipated 1964-1967 strategic strike force and the characteristics of individual weapons systems.

4. The prospective military threats to the U.S. overseas base system -- analyzed in WSEG Report No. 48 and a preceding section of WSEG Report No. 50 (Appendix "E" to Enclosure "A") -- are recognized here but not reviewed in detail.

CONCLUSIONS

5. The ability to deploy forces and to conduct military operations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is and will continue to be a major strategic asset of the United States. Exploitation of this asset, through the U.S. overseas base system, will remain dependent on the active cooperation of U.S. allies.

6. The present U.S. overseas base system is both complex and extensive. U.S. forces are now stationed at 160 main bases on foreign soil. The total of all Service requirements for overseas

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bases, including many minor facilities and contingency needs, comprises some 2,500 items in some 100 countries or locations throughout the Free World. The primary functions of these bases are to support the strategic offensive mission and to assist in the defense of CONUS, the NATO area, and strategically important areas of the Far East.

7. U.S. base requirements vary with military, technological and political developments that include improvements in both U.S. weaponry and in the military capability of allies. For the past two years, however, the effect of these improvements has been more than offset by new base requirements generated by changes in the nature of the military threat or in the means available to deal with it. There has been a marked increase in the number of countries in which the U.S. requires military facilities.

8. The present U.S. overseas base system is insufficient in scope to support military operations in many countries exposed to Communist aggression, particularly in those countries that lie on the southern periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Base requirements for limited war operations are likely to increase with expansion of Sino-Soviet influence outside the Eurasian continent, particularly should the U.S. and USSR reach and recognize a "stalemate" on the strategic level.

9. One of the controlling factors in the disposition and employment of these forces will continue to be that of logistic support and the related use of overseas staging and supply bases. Prospective improvements in the technology of military transport do not promise a significant degree of independence from such facilities.

10. The protective measures that may become necessary for the effective use of U.S. overseas forces in the 1964-1967 period are

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likely to increase base requirements. This is particularly true of such measures as the wider dispersal of theater strike aircraft or their replacement by either STOL vehicles or hardened and dispersed tactical missiles.

11. Whether or not such a stalemate occurs, a wide range of U.S. military and political objectives can be met only by the presence of U.S. forces in strategic areas of the Free World. Technological advances may permit some consolidation or reduction in these forces, but the effect of their presence cannot be duplicated from remote locations.

12. There are and will continue to be serious doubts about the utility of overseas-based nuclear strike systems in a general war that begins with a well-coordinated Soviet missile and aircraft attack. Despite their vulnerability, however, these systems and bases contribute to deterrence of a general war by complicating Soviet coordination problems and increasing the number of countries that the Soviets would have to attack in a first strike.

13. The expected composition of the 1964 to 1967 strategic offensive force augurs a sharp decline in those weapons systems now considered suitable for overseas deployment, and a corresponding decline in SAC overseas base requirements. Existing SAC bases could, however, remain useful for CASF operations or the dispersal of theater forces.

14. Deployment of the POLARIS (FEM) system within range of its targets is not dependent on use of overseas facilities, but their availability would increase the utilization of this system. The importance of overseas logistic, communications and navigational support to the FEM system will diminish during the 1964 to 1967 period.

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15. Overseas facilities for the collection of all forms of intelligence on bloc activities are related to the strategic mission and will remain of critical importance in this time period. Although it may become possible to gather certain types of intelligence from remote locations, several of the new intelligence and warning systems can be most effectively employed from overseas sites.

16. New overseas base requirements will also be generated by the introduction of military space systems, and the extension of U.S. missile testing facilities.

### DISCUSSION

#### INTRODUCTION

17. The ability to deploy forces and to conduct other military operations on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc is a major strategic asset of the United States. Exploitation of this asset, through the collaboration of allies and the U.S. overseas base system, has enabled this country to compensate, at least in part, for the distances that separate us from our military allies and for the Sino-Soviet bloc's advantages of military secrecy and interior lines of communication.

18. U.S. overseas base requirements<sup>1/</sup> stem from the nature of this country's political objectives, the military threats to those objectives, and the level and character of the resources made available to meet those threats. Such resources include U.S. military strategy, forces and weapons systems of diverse

<sup>1/</sup> The term "overseas bases" is used here to include all U.S. force deployments, military bases, installations and facilities outside the continental United States.

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
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and changeable characteristics, and facilities made available by other nations of the Free World as part of a collective defense effort.

19. As a consequence of these factors, judgments and commitments the United States now maintains active offensive, defensive or major support forces at some 160 main base complexes on overseas territory. The three Services have a combined total of 2500 requirements for the retention or establishment of overseas bases in some 100 countries, territories or locations throughout the Free World.<sup>1/</sup> Many of these requirements are for minor technical or logistic facilities, or are mobilization requirements to be met only under wartime or other emergency conditions. Their approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, reflects a judgment that each is of net advantage to U.S. security and, specifically, could be expected to assist in the conduct of war under current strategic concepts.<sup>2/</sup>



- 1/ United States Base Requirements Overseas (USERO), JCS 570/512, 12 July 1960, TOP SECRET. This list of Service base requirements is reviewed annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and distributed as a basis for inter-service and inter-Department programming and guidance.
- 2/ In accordance with JCS and NSC policy directives.

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
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21. It might be assumed at the outset that the number of bases needed for these purposes would steadily diminish as a by-product of improvements in both U.S. weaponry and the military capabilities of our allies. In practice, such reductions appear to be more than offset by new requirements generated by changes in the nature of the military threat or in the means available to deal with it.

22. In the course of the 1960 USBRO review, for example, there were deletions of 400 U.S. overseas base requirements but additions of more than 600 new ones. Major deletions included 19 air bases in France and Germany and an appreciable number of aircraft support facilities in France and the United Kingdom.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ The findings of this report were recently reviewed by a committee headed by Mr. William E. Lang, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. See Review of United States Overseas Military Bases, April 1960, ~~TOP SECRET~~, which is referred to hereafter as the Lang Committee report.

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Requirements for 18,000 troop housing spaces in France, West Germany, Italy and Korea were also dropped after some consolidation of facilities and a reevaluation of requirements. Among the significant new requirements, however, were those for 24 Special Weapons Storage Sites in West Germany, contingency requirements for staging areas and logistic support facilities in eight countries of Southeast Asia and requirements for specialized intelligence collection facilities in 38 other countries.

23. There has also been a perceptible broadening in the geographic areas considered of military interest to the United States, and a consequent increase in the number of governments from which we desire military collaboration in some specific form. In 1959, USBRO requirements were approved for logistic facilities in nine countries not previously listed. Fourteen countries and eight territories or colonial possessions were added to the USBRO list for the first time in 1960 to meet new requirements for communications, space tracking and recovery, and intelligence collection facilities. In view of current political developments it is of interest that five of these "new" countries are in Central and South America.

24. These facts have been mentioned to indicate the element of fluidity in the overseas base system -- new base needs are being generated by military and technological developments as older requirements are discarded. A prospective decline in one type of requirement does not therefore diminish the present and potential military value of overseas bases, and the collaboration of Free World countries, to the United States.

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25. Present U.S. overseas bases and force deployments can be divided into those primarily associated with (1) the strategic offensive mission, (2) the air and sea defense of North America and its lines of communication to Europe, (3) the defense of the NATO area, and (4) the defense of strategically important areas of the Far East.<sup>1/</sup>

26. This classification is adopted here, although it is recognized that the theater defense forces may be deployed to areas outside those of primary interest, and that elements of these forces have a strategic offensive capability.<sup>2/</sup> It should also be said that many U.S. overseas bases support two or more of the above functions. Facilities for communications, logistic support and the collection of military intelligence are of this multi-purpose type.

#### OVERSEAS BASES AND THE STRATEGIC MISSION 1960

27. The B-47 (STRATOJET) medium bomber has been the strategic offensive system most closely associated with the U.S. overseas bases. Its range limitations made forward bases essential to attack on Soviet targets. Bases spread along the bloc periphery also provided the protection of dispersal and the tactical advantage of being able to penetrate Soviet air defenses from different directions.

28. In recent years, however, an increased availability of tankers, a buildup in the B-52 (STRATOFORTRESS)/KC-135 force, and the evident vulnerability of overseas airbases to missile

<sup>1/</sup> This is the classification used in the Lang Committee report.  
<sup>2/</sup> These include attack carrier and tactical air forces with nuclear capability and those aerodynamic missile systems (such as TM 76 A/B) whose range approximates that of tactical aircraft. They are grouped here with the theater defense forces on the understanding that their general war missions are directly related to theater defense.

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attack have led to a gradual decline in the number of medium bombers deployed outside the U.S. in peacetime. Both political pressures and new technological requirements have also reduced the number of bases utilized by SAC abroad.

29. SAC has released 11 of its U.K. bases within the past three years, and the U.S. recently agreed to relinquish the three SAC bases in Morocco by 1963. Four of the U.K. bases were turned over to U.S. tactical squadrons withdrawn from France in the aftermath of a dispute over nuclear weapons stockpiles. The seven other U.K. bases were considered as no longer meeting SAC requirements and were returned to U.K. forces.

30. B-47 bombers are currently deployed at ten air bases on foreign soil; these include four bases in the United Kingdom, three in Spain and three in Morocco. Aircraft are rotated to these bases on an average 21-day cycle with the deployed forces maintained in a "reflex" ground alert posture that keeps an average of six B-47's on 15-minute alert at each base. Medium bomber forces are also rotated from CONUS to two bases in Alaska and one in Guam. SAC's present command structure assigns all strategic aircraft to the three numbered Air Forces in the United States (the Second, Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces). The overseas SAC commands (the Sixteenth AF at Torrejon, Spain, the Seventh Air Division at South Ruislip, England, and the Third Air Division at Andersen AFB, Guam) are charged with base maintenance and the supervision of those SAC aircraft operating in their area.

31. It is understood that those B-47 forces deployed outside the U.S. in "reflex" or maneuver operations are scheduled to launch immediate strikes in the event of a general war.

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Appreciable portions of the medium force may be subsequently deployed overseas should SAC bases remain available for follow-on operations.

32. A wing of B-52 heavy bombers is deployed with its tanker force to Ramey AFB in Puerto Rico. According to the Lang Committee report this is the only airbase outside CONUS in use, or programmed for use, for the peacetime deployment of B-52's. In the event of a general war, all heavy bombers are to conduct operations from the Western Hemisphere. Air Force policy is to place minimum reliance on prestrike staging bases for such operations, using in-flight refueling whenever practical.

33. SAC plans to use nine tanker facilities outside the U.S. for wartime support of the heavy and medium bomber forces. Six of these bases are in Canada and one each in Greenland, Bermuda, and the Azores. In addition to their general war missions, the Canadian bases could also be used for support of a "forward" air alert should the Canadian government agree to this form of overflight with nuclear weapons.

34. SAC has additional requirements for bases to be used only in the context of a general war. A majority of these bases are now used by other sections of the USAF; they include four bases in the U.K., two in Japan and one each in Turkey and on Okinawa. Post-strike recovery is contemplated at airfields in other countries, such as Pakistan, to which there are presently no U.S. base rights and where no peacetime deployment is planned.

35. In the absence of data on their wartime roles, the utility of these SAC overseas bases would appear to have been severely compromised by Soviet MRBM and IREM developments. As Albert

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Wohlstetter commented two years ago, these bases "are subject to an attack delivering more bombs with larger yields and greater accuracies and with less warning than bases at intercontinental ranges. Whether they are under American command, or completely within the control of our allies, or under joint control, they present the severest problems for the preservation of a deterrent force."<sup>1/</sup> Possible exceptions to this conclusion would be if the deployed bombers were used in a pre-emptive strike, or in counter-force missions against a very poorly coordinated Soviet attack.

36. The presence of these bases may, however, contribute to a form of political deterrence by forcing the Soviets to attack a larger number of countries should they opt for general war. SAC overseas bases also increase the force requirements and coordination problems of a Soviet first strike, although neither of these difficulties would appear to present the Soviets with insuperable problems.<sup>2/</sup>

#### OVERSEAS BASES AND THE DEFENSE OF CONUS

37. The second major function of U.S. overseas bases and force deployments is defense of the continental United States itself. While all U.S. and many allied military forces contribute in a general or ultimate sense to this task, it is the primary and immediate role of those facilities associated with strategic and tactical warning and the active defense of the sea and air approaches to this continent.

#### Strategic Warning

38. Strategic warning is generally defined as a notification that enemy hostilities may be imminent, without reference to the

<sup>1/</sup> "The Delicate Balance of Terror," RAND P-1472, 6 November 1958, p. 32. CONFIDENTIAL.

<sup>2/</sup> Possible Soviet methods of combining attacks on the U.S. and overseas SAC bases are discussed in Albert Wohlstetter, "Another Look at the Importance of Overseas Bases," Air Force and Space Digest, Vol. 43, No. 5 (May, 1960) p. 73f.

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Electronic intercept (ELINT) sites, for example, must be located as close to the "target" areas as possible; critical installations of this type are maintained in [REDACTED]

Do [REDACTED] a number of other countries allied to the U.S. Conduct of these operations from U.S. ships and aircraft would not be possible in many cases, and would provide only partial or intermittent coverage in others.

Tactical Warning

42. Tactical warning -- notice that the enemy has initiated hostilities -- may come in principle from U.S. overseas bases, from allied nations on whom the attack is first launched, or from the detonation of nuclear warheads on U.S. soil. Primary reliance for warning of air and missile attack on CONUS, however, is now placed on networks of air, land and sea based radars in the Western Hemisphere. A large portion of these facilities are on foreign soil.

43. For warning of the air-breathing threat, these facilities include three radar lines across the northern segment of the North American continent. Included in this network are approximately 100 aircraft control and warning installations on Canadian soil. Requirements for more than 70 additional (gap filler) facilities in Canada were approved in 1960.

44. Land, sea and air extensions of this system run from Alaska to the Aleutians and Midway Island in the Pacific, and from Baffin Island to Newfoundland and the Azores in the Atlantic. Programmed additions will run from Baffin Island to the United Kingdom in a chain linking Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes Islands.

45. To provide this country with tactical warning of missile attack, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)

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is under construction at sites in Alaska, Greenland and the United Kingdom. The contribution of the U.K. radar site is to provide coverage against 15-degree trajectories launched from the westernmost portion of the Soviet Union against the eastern United States.

Active Defense: Aircraft and Missiles

46. Active defense of CONUS against air attack is provided by manned interceptors in addition to area and point defense surface-to-air missiles. The majority of these weapons are located in the United States. There is no operational system for active defense against ballistic missiles. Tentative plans for the NIKE-ZEUS antimissile system, however, call for three local defense centers and five fire units on Canadian soil.

Active Defense: Sea and Air LOC's

47. Two tiers of U.S. air and naval bases extend across the North Atlantic Ocean to Europe and North Africa, forming an integral part of our lines of communication to Europe and making possible the defense of these arteries in time of war. Localized AEW and ASW operations conducted from these bases may also play an important part in the defense of CONUS against missile-firing submarines. Additional uses of these bases include the logistic support of carrier groups and other naval forces in wartime.

48. Key links in these North Atlantic base chains are Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the U.K. in the north, and Bermuda and the Azores in the central area. Naval and air facilities in Cuba and on islands of the West Indies Federation provide coverage of the Caribbean area and approaches to the Panama Canal.

49. A similar range of military operations for the maintenance and defense of LOC's in the Northern, Central and Eastern Pacific is made possible by a chain of multi-purpose bases on U.S. or

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U.S. controlled territory. Bases at Adak and Kodiak, Alaska, provide communications, logistic and intelligence support for operations in the North Pacific and Bering Sea areas. Pearl Harbor is the major naval base for forces operating in the Central Pacific. Midway Island provides a staging base for aircraft in transit to Japan and Guam a medium naval base, air station and bulk storage site for forces operating in the Western Pacific. It is the westernmost major base complex under firm U.S. control.

OVERSEAS BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

50. By far the major portion of U.S. overseas force deployments are those associated with deterrence of attack on the NATO area and the defense of that area should deterrence fail. The comparatively large peacetime deployments to Europe reflect both the seriousness of the Communist threat to that area and a judgment that its loss to the bloc would constitute a most serious threat to the security of the United States.

51. A measure of this judgment is that of 14 active U.S. army divisions, five are stationed in West Germany for the defense of central Europe. An additional 4000 men (not committed to NATO) are stationed in West Berlin. These forces utilize some 15 base areas in West Germany and are supported by an extensive logistic complex that runs across France from the Bordeaux-La Pallice port area to Kaiserlauten, Germany.

52. The Lang Report states that a majority of the USAF's overseas tactical strength is deployed to Europe and comprises 39 tactical squadrons.

1/ From Table I, Enclosure "A", Part II, of WSEG Report No. 48,  
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53. These USAFE units have been assigned a large number of automatic strike targets in the event of a general war. The great majority of these are counterforce targets -- such as airfields and military control centers -- that pose a direct and immediate threat to the theater forces and our NATO allies.<sup>1/</sup>

54. A few staging bases and long-range airfields are included on these target lists, but only a small number of the USAFE automatic targets are also scheduled for attack by SAC forces. Except for the rotational squadrons the USAFE areas of target responsibility are primarily in the satellite countries.<sup>2/</sup>

55. Naval forces for the defense of the Southern NATO area are centered in the Sixth Fleet, deployed in the Mediterranean. The Navy's policy has been to keep two CVA's in the Mediterranean, and one of these is usually in the Eastern Mediterranean, at all times.<sup>3/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> Targeting data for both land and carrier-based tactical air are taken from Vol. V, Part II of WSEG Report No. 48, TOP SECRET.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3/</sup> Three CVA's, one with an all-attack A/C loading, are currently deployed to the Mediterranean in what is regarded as a temporary strengthening of U.S. strike power in the area. This increased deployment has almost doubled the number of naval attack aircraft in the Mediterranean; it has also increased the use made of naval air bases in Spain and Italy. VFR and other aircraft displaced from the all-attack carrier have been stationed at Rota, Spain, and Sigonella, Italy, to provide coverage when the CVA is in their operating area.

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Aircraft from these carriers are assigned primary responsibility for about 55 counterforce targets, about half of them in the southwestern USSR and the remainder in the satellite countries. The Sixth Fleet also has secondary responsibility for targets assigned to those U.S. tactical air squadrons in Italy and Turkey.

56. The Sixth Fleet receives the majority of its peacetime provisions from CONUS by way of replenishment ships. The bulk of its peacetime requirements for fuel and lubricants, however, is supplied from commercial sources in Naples. Here, and in the Far East, the number of supply ships normally assigned to the deployed fleets is not sufficient to free them from dependence on overseas supply stores. This applies particularly to the high tonnage requirements of POL and ammunition, and no drastic reduction of this use of overseas facilities is in prospect.

57. In addition to its bulk POL and ammunition storage at bases in Spain and Italy, the Navy has, or plans to have, wartime supplies of these and other critical materials prestocked at about 25 other locations in the Mediterranean area. These include sites in the Balaeric Islands, Greece, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.

58. Primary communications support for both fleet and air units operating in the Mediterranean is provided by a complex of land-based facilities near Port Lyautey, Morocco. An installation at Asmara, Eriteria (Ethiopia), provides communications coverage of the Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and West Indian Ocean. Reliance on these land-based communication facilities will be reduced by the availability of communication ships in the 1963 to 1967 period.

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OVERSEAS BASES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE FAR EAST

59. The pattern of U.S. military deployments in the Pacific is influenced by the great distances involved and the relatively limited number of base facilities available. These conditions, coupled to the fact that our allies in this area are less capable of defending themselves than are those in Europe, have resulted in heavy utilization of a relatively small number of base complexes.

60. Major Army deployments in the Far East include two divisions of the Eighth Army and a missile command in Korea and an infantry division split between Okinawa and Hawaii. Support for the forces in Korea is provided from 22 installations in that country, and from bases in Japan and on Okinawa. The Marine Corps has one division deployed to Okinawa, less one regiment which is in Hawaii, and one aircraft wing in Japan, less one aircraft group also in Hawaii. The Hawaii-based units are organized into the First Marine Brigade.

61. According to the Lang Committee Report the Air Force now operates some 40 tactical and tactical support squadrons in the Far East, utilizing six bases in Japan, two each in Korea and Okinawa and one in the Philippines. There are wartime requirements for two bases each in Korea and Taiwan that are now occupied by host nation forces. Important air transit facilities for both peace and wartime requirements are on the island bases of Guam, Wake, Eniwetok, Midway and Johnston Islands.

62. The approximate present deployment of nuclear-capable tactical air forces in the Pacific theater comprises 48 B-57B's and 150 F-100D's tactical missile groups  
(TM-61C) 75 F-100D's  
and 25 F-100D's These PACAF forces

1/ From Table II, Enclosure "A", Part II of WSEG Report No. 48.  
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are assigned several hundred Russian, Chinese Communist and North Korean targets of a type not requiring surveillance prior to attack.

63. Eight of the Navy's 14 in-commission attack carriers are generally assigned to the Pacific Fleet, with from 2-3 of these CVA's deployed in the Western Pacific with the Seventh Fleet. The Navy's policy has been to keep at least one of these CVA's in the vicinity of the Philippines and another in the area of Southern Japan. Logistic support for these naval forces is provided by a mix of mobile support and shore-based stocks, but the distances involved and the limited number of support ships available have resulted in considerable dependence on the major naval base complexes in Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa and on Guam. Of these the Japanese bases have been described as the hub of logistic capability in WESTPAC.<sup>1/</sup> Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan, is the principle naval base for forces operating in the Western Pacific; Sasebo, Kyushu, Japan, is a major fleet anchorage and includes the largest POL reserve west of Pearl Harbor. It has been estimated that loss of these two bases alone would require a very substantial increase in mobile support ships to maintain the present readiness of the Seventh Fleet.

64. Our allies in Asia are less likely than are those in Europe to achieve offensive capabilities that would permit a reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces. U.S. land-based nuclear strike forces in the Far East are already concentrated on what would appear to be a dangerously limited number of island air bases. The vulnerability of these bases and the requirements for greater dispersal would increase markedly should the Chinese Communists acquire a nuclear capability.

<sup>1/</sup> The functions and individual importance of U.S. naval bases in the Pacific and Mediterranean are discussed in Enclosure "G", Vol. IV, WSEG Report No. 48. TOP SECRET.

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SHORTCOMINGS OF THE OVERSEAS BASE SYSTEM

Limited War

65. Between those U.S. bases in the Far East and those in Turkey lies a wide segment of the bloc's periphery on which the United States has relatively few military installations and no major base complexes. The dearth of facilities to support U.S. military operations in this area of the world is made more serious by the fact that the free nations of South and Southeast Asia are highly exposed to Communist overt and covert aggression and are able to maintain only relatively low levels of indigenous military strength.

NSC 66. This shortcoming of the present U.S. overseas base system has been recognized in ~~SECRET~~ Lang Committee and in WSDG Report No. 48. It is reflected in the large number of U.S. military requirements for bases in Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, North Borneo, Rhodesia, and Vietnam to which there are presently no base rights. <sup>1/</sup> Political difficulties in making the necessary base and rights agreements have been a major obstacle to fulfillment of these requirements.

67. Political restrictions on the use of certain U.S. overseas base facilities have also led to undesirable concentrations or deployments of U.S. nuclear strike weapons. Refusal of the French to permit U.S. nuclear stockpiles on their territory has resulted in a concentration of tactical aircraft in Germany and the U.K. The Japanese ban on nuclear weapons has led the U.S. to place an undesirable reliance on use of air facilities in South Korea. Both these examples indicate the military importance of political cohesion within the Western Alliance.

<sup>1/</sup> These requirements include air movement facilities, bulk storage, communications sites, ports and anchorages, staging areas and extensive logistic support facilities that would be needed for operations in these areas or, in a limited number of cases, for U.S. operations in a general war. See listings under the countries named in the 1960 USERO, JCS 570/512, TOP SECRET.

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General War

68. Considerable doubt has been raised about the utility of the U.S. overseas base system -- and particularly about the wartime availability of those U.S. nuclear strike forces deployed overseas -- in the context of a general war that begins with a well coordinated Soviet missile strike. A recent WSEG study of tactical air forces in a general war situation concluded that both U.S. land and carrier-based strike aircraft have a present capability to launch a very substantial number of weapons against military targets in the event of a U.S. initiative attack, but added that:<sup>1/</sup>

"The USAF and PACAF bases represent highly vulnerable complexes which can be destroyed by medium range ballistic missile attacks from within the Sino-Soviet Bloc and which are well within the estimated range of Soviet capabilities in the 1960 to 1963 time period. Deployment of these missiles within the USSR only would allow coverage of present overseas tactical bases except Taiwan and the Philippines.

"It is improbable that these forces will receive tactical warning of a Soviet missile attack sufficient to enable any aircraft to be launched before impact of the first missile in the theater.

"Under certain conditions of strategic alert the USAF and PACAF forces may be able to launch about 30 percent of the force if the enemy's missile coordination of a worldwide attack is poor (such that the forces receive 5 minutes of used warning and the enemy attack is spread over 20 minutes)

<sup>1/</sup> These are among the conclusions reached in Part II of WSEG Report No. 48, 1 August 1960, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA. The term "used warning" here refers to warning received, and acted upon by the launching of strike aircraft.

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and our response to the initial phases of such an attack is virtually instantaneous. A significant decrease of the survivability of the force can be expected with a well coordinated enemy attack or with our present communication delays.

"In the event of a daytime surprise missile attack with no strategic warning, it is considered improbable that more than a small fraction of the aircraft force (less than 10 percent of the total force) could be launched even if the enemy's missile arrivals are spread over a 20-minute period.

"In the event of an enemy attack in general war, the ability of the deployed carrier forces to survive long enough to launch all their aircraft is critically dependent upon receipt of strategic warning."

69. These problems are compounded by the difficulties likely to beset U.S. military command and control arrangements in the initial phase of a general war. Assuming even that a timely national decision could be made to release the overseas strike forces, there may be considerable doubt that execution orders could reach them before these forces fell under attack. This problem stems from the disruption of command and communication systems that may occur as an intentional or "bonus" product of a Soviet first strike.<sup>1/</sup>

70. Another type of limitation on the use of overseas bases and strike forces in a general war is that of host nation reactions to the crisis that might precede such a conflict. Should the Soviets offer sanctuary to these nations, in return for their neutrality, U.S. forces deployed or dependent

<sup>1/</sup> These command and control problems are discussed in Enclosure "C" of WSEG Report No. 50, TOP SECRET, and in WSEG Staff Study No. 78, TOP SECRET.

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on the territories involved may be incapacitated regardless of U.S. intentions in the matter. The likelihood of this contingency arising will depend on the cohesion of the Western alliance and the rigidity of its military arrangements at the time, as well as the time element involved. A prolonged crisis situation, for example, might allow host nations to neutralize U.S. strike forces before the United States had decided to either launch or withdraw them. Such actions would of course put the U.S. on notice that these weapons systems might not be available and, perhaps, permit other arrangements for coverage of their wartime targets. At the very least, however, the possibility of such contingencies emphasizes the importance of a high degree of cohesion within the Western alliance, and retention of both deployment and target flexibility for those nuclear strike systems which the U.S. deploys overseas.

71. Without entering into a discussion of these problems, it appears that they can be but partially alleviated by such protective measures as the provision of bomb alarm systems, more secure and redundant communications, the introduction of higher performance (faster reacting) tactical aircraft and missile systems and providing theater strike forces with the protection of hardening, greater dispersal or mobility. Proximity to the potential enemy, and the use of territory not under U.S. control, will continue to qualify the general war utility of overseas-based strike systems in this period.

72. These doubts do not invalidate one form of contribution made by overseas bases and strike systems to the deterrence of general war. Regardless of their vulnerability, their very existence complicates Soviet coordination problems and increases the number of countries and areas to be covered in a Soviet

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first strike. Nor does their general war vulnerability reduce the importance of U.S. overseas bases and strike forces for the great majority of missions -- ranging from psychological bolstering of the alliance to use in less-than-general war -- to which they now contribute. Many of these tasks promise to remain important to U.S. security in the mid-1960's and may increase in importance should a genuine "nuclear stalemate" occur at the strategic level.

73. Whether or not such a stalemate occurs, or is thought to occur, there will remain U.S. military and political objectives that can be met only by the presence of U.S. forces at or near troubled and threatened overseas areas. While improvements in military technology and the capabilities of allies may permit some reduction in U.S. overseas deployments during this period, the psychological effects of their presence in strategically important areas of Europe and the Far East cannot be duplicated from remote locations.

74. One of the controlling factors in the disposition and employment of these forces will continue to be that of logistic support and the related use of overseas staging and supply bases. Prospective developments in military technology, such as the introduction of long-range military jet transports or the wider use of nuclear ship power, do not promise independence from these facilities. Instead, the protective measures that may become necessary for the effective use of these forces are likely to increase U.S. overseas base requirements. This is particularly true of such measures as the wider dispersal of theater tactical aircraft, or their replacement by either STOL systems or hardened and dispersed tactical missiles.

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OVERSEAS BASES AND THE STRATEGIC MISSION 1964 to 1967

75. Changes in weapons systems and related areas of military technology may alter U.S. requirements for overseas bases in the 1964 to 1967 period. Changes in the types and numbers of weapons available to our potential enemies may, as suggested above, seriously compromise the value of overseas-based strike systems in a general war environment. Improvements in our own weaponry may permit certain military operations to be conducted from increasingly remote locations. New weapons and associated military techniques may also require location close to the bloc to be effective.

76. It is difficult to predict the 1964 to 1967 composition of the U.S. strategic strike force, as unforeseen political, economic and technological factors may alter both the characteristics of this force and the level of resources devoted to this part of the defense effort.. Characteristics of the principal strategic offensive systems likely to be available in the 1964 to 1967 period are, however, given in earlier Enclosures to this Report, and nominal force levels have been predicted on the basis of anticipated funding and Service programs. The estimated 1960 to 1967 composition of the strategic strike force is given in Table I for those weapons now considered suitable for overseas deployment.

Strategic Aircraft

77. These estimates augur a sharp reduction in the medium bomber and tanker force during the period of interest. The B-47 force is expected to decline 50 percent from its present level by the beginning of FY 1964 and to phase out entirely in FY 1965-66. As the B-47 is the only strategic bomber deployed or scheduled for peacetime deployment outside

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TABLE I

FORCE LEVEL PROJECTIONS FOR SELECTED U.S.  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1961 TO 1967<sup>a/</sup>

Weapons System	U.E.	Number of Units at End of Fiscal Year						
		1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>								
B-47	15	84	64	52	36	16	0	0
B-52	15	37	42	45	48	48	47	45
B-58	9	4	9	12	12	12	12	12
ASM's								
GAM-77	14	16	29	29	29	27	18	8
GAM-87	30	0	0	0	5	15	25	29
KC-97	20	30	24	14	9	4	0	0
KC-135	10	40	46	53	62	70	70	68

MISSILES<sup>b/</sup>

POLARIS (subs)	--	5	7	10	14	26	38	45
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a/ From Table II, Enclosure "F", WSEG Report No. 50, SECRET, and based on Service MS estimates.

b/ As far as is known to the authors of this report, there are no plans to deploy U.S. manned squadrons of THOR/JUPITER ICBM's, or ATLAS/TITAN/MINUTEMAN/ICBM's outside the continental United States.

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the Western Hemisphere, <sup>1/</sup> its phase-out should reduce this type of overseas base requirement. Overseas bases now used by the B-47 force, however, could remain useful as staging bases for CASF-type air movements into limited war areas or as a means of dispersing theater air forces in depth during crises or contingency alert periods. There may in fact occur times of diplomatic crisis, or crises induced by limited war operations, in which widespread deployment of aircraft that are normally based in CONUS would strengthen our deterrent posture. Such temporary dispersal measures would complicate the problems of a Soviet first strike both politically and militarily.

78. As an appreciable B-52 heavy bomber force will remain in inventory through the 1964-1967 period, SAC will continue to require overseas recovery sites for these aircraft. The present SAC bases in Canada could also be used for support of a forward B-52 (or conceivably B-70) air alert should the Canadian government agree to such a tactic.

79. No overseas deployment of U.S. manned, land-based ICBM's or IRBM's is now contemplated. SACEUR has an MRBM requirement but it is far from certain that these weapons would be manned by U.S. personnel. Probable controls over the use of these weapons, and the fact that their mission would correspond more to that of tactical than strategic aircraft, precludes them from being considered as part of the U.S. strategic force.

1/ It is not expected that the B-58A (HUSTLER) medium bomber will be deployed overseas during this period. Relevant factors may include the maintenance requirements of this aircraft, the relatively small number of aircraft in inventory and the fact that the B-58's reaction time (from ground alert to take-off) appears to be no faster than that of the B-47E. On this point see the characteristics of these aircraft in Annexes "A" and "B" to Enclosure "G", WSEG Report No. 50, SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA.

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FBM Submarines

80. The POLARIS or Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) system is somewhat of an exception to this trend of diminishing reliance on strategic weapons bases overseas. The POLARIS is a strategic offensive system programmed for overseas deployment in increasing numbers through the 1960 to 1967 period. The utilization of this system will be influenced by the availability of overseas facilities, but it is not dependent upon them.

81. Technical characteristics and nominal force levels for the POLARIS system are given in previous Enclosures to this Report; those of primary interest here are its programmed deployment, operation and anticipated reliance on overseas facilities.

82. The principal factors affecting deployment of the POLARIS submarines are (1) a decision to deploy this weapons system within range of its targets, (2) the range of the POLARIS missile, and (3) the location of the POLARIS target system. Secondary influences are the availability of logistic support and estimates of Soviet ASW capability in given areas.

83. Range capability of the initial (A-1) POLARIS missile is expected to be 1200 n.mi. A 1500-n.mi. version is expected in 1962 and an A-3 POLARIS with range in excess of 2000 n.mi. in 1964-65. By the end of FY 1964 all FBM submarines are to be equipped with the A-2 missile and all 45 submarines are scheduled to be equipped with the A-3 missile by the end of FY 1968.

84. The great majority of those urban complexes considered appropriate targets for the POLARIS missile are located west of the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union and can therefore be reached by the A-1 missile from submarines deployed in the

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North, Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. Both the initial and the heaviest programmed deployment of FBM submarines will be to these areas. Only when the force inventory reaches a level of 37 submarines (about August 1966 under present Navy programs) is deployment to the Western Pacific contemplated for coverage of targets in the Eastern Soviet Union and Communist China. Deployment of the POLARIS force can, however, be shifted in accordance with changes in missile characteristics or target systems. (Should political factors or Sino-Soviet ASW countermeasures make such a move desirable, the force could also be held in mid-ocean areas with a deferred strike role.)

85. The total POLARIS force which the Navy believes desirable for coverage of Sino-Soviet targets is in the neighborhood of 45-50 submarines. As the 45th submarine is not expected to be ready for sea until 1967, the Navy's objective is to keep as large a percentage of the initial force as possible at sea and in preselected launch areas. For this reason the deployed submarines are to receive their administrative and logistic support from tenders based overseas in the general proximity of the launch areas. Through the use of this forward support system, it is expected that more than 60 percent of the total FBM force can be kept on station and ready to fire. Were support to come only from CONUS, it has been estimated that only a third of the FBM force could be kept on station for transit distances of 3000 miles.

86. The most desirable location for the first tender is considered to be in the United Kingdom and the second in the Central Mediterranean. The tenders will have maintenance facilities for the POLARIS missile and are likely to have special weapons on board. They are expected to be a recognizable element of the FBM strategic offensive system.

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87. The FBM system will also receive communications support and navigational aid from overseas facilities. VLF transmitting stations, the primary means of communicating to deployed submarines, are located, outside the U.S., at [REDACTED]

DOS [REDACTED] (A high power VLF station for independent coverage of the Western European area is under construction at Cutler, Maine and [REDACTED])

88. To maintain security over FBM movements, it is expected that deployed submarines will communicate to CONUS primarily by the HARE system of high-speed "burst" radio transmissions. HARE receivers are presently too large for installation on ships or aircraft and, as the reliable range of these messages is considered to be but 3000 miles, a number of overseas land-based receiver stations are planned. These include receiver sites at [REDACTED]

DOS [REDACTED] Alaska, Hawaii and Guam. In this connection it is possible that HARE messages could be of relevance to strategic warning should, for example, the Soviets intensify their ASW activities in preparation for a first strike. LORAN "C" stations, a supplementary navigational aid to the deployed submarines, are being established in [REDACTED]

89. In sum, the deployment of FBM submarines within range of their targets is not dependent on use of overseas facilities, but the availability of such installations will influence the utilization of the system. This influence is primarily on the number of submarines that can be kept in patrol areas, and is therefore of most importance when the total number

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of FBM submarines is relatively small. As the force grows in size, and missile range extensions increase the feasible deployment areas, overseas logistic support is likely to diminish in importance. Anticipated developments in the communications field, including global VLF coverage from transmitters on U.S. territory and the development of shipborne HARE receivers, will further reduce system requirements for overseas facilities in the mid-sixties.

90. The cooperation of allied nations, however, is likely to remain of advantage to this system in the 1964 to 1967 period, particularly should the Soviets attempt to locate, shadow, harass and/or clandestinely destroy deployed FBM submarines in peacetime. <sup>1/</sup> Possible countermeasures to such a Soviet effort include the submarines' taking shelter in shallow or sheltered waters, [REDACTED]

DO5 [REDACTED] While it is not expected that FBM submarines will ordinarily patrol in the waters of allied nations, the use of their islands, bays, and other natural shelters could be of considerable importance for the evasion of detection and attack. U.S. and allied surface ships could also be used to locate and harass Soviet ASW units.

91. Conversely, FBM submarines may be prohibited from operating in certain areas, such as the Red or Arabian seas, for political reasons. Such denial is most likely to apply to FBM tenders (as readily recognizable elements of a nuclear weapons system).

1/ This prospect is assessed in Enclosure "E" to WSEG Report No. 50, SECRET, on which the above discussion of the FBM system is based.

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Soviet access to or control over additional land areas near FBM deployment sectors would facilitate their ASW efforts.

#### Intelligence and Warning

92. Closely related to the strategic mission is the problem of gaining intelligence of Sino-Soviet weapons and activities. The need for all forms of information on Communist Bloc activities has increased markedly during the cold war and no slackening of this trend is expected. Instead, the increasing seriousness of the military threat to CONUS and the expense of possible defensive measures are likely to generate more stringent requirements for both timely intelligence and greater detail.

93. The great bulk of the information now obtainable, particularly that type of information associated with strategic warning, comes from installations and intelligence activities overseas. Improvements in technology have resulted in some consolidation of these activities, and should provide additional and/or more detailed information from more remote locations in the mid-sixties, but are not expected to reduce the value of intelligence operations on the Bloc periphery.

94. Several of the newer intelligence and warning systems discussed in earlier Enclosures to this Report would depend on overseas facilities for their effectiveness. One of these techniques envisages the use of airborne infrared sensors to detect missile launchings within the Soviet Union. Two methods of operation for such aircraft were suggested -- "Arctic patrol" missions along the northern periphery of the Bloc and "loiter type" missions over allied territory on the Bloc's borders. Both such tactics would require the use of overseas airbases. Another such technique is the suggested use of over-the-horizon radar systems to detect both missile launchings and nuclear explosions within

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the Bloc area. A variety of these systems [redacted] etc.) are under development but have range characteristics that make overseas basing desirable, or even necessary, to their effective use. One suggested [redacted] ICBM-warning system, for example, envisages radar sets of this type in [redacted]

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95. Other attack warning systems that may become necessary in the early and mid-1960's involve use of overseas sites. An example would be the use of BMEWS-type line-of-sight radars to provide coverage against Soviet "long-way-around" (16,000 n.mi.) missiles that are launched along southern trajectories. Suggested sites for such a "Southern Fence" are either close to probable launch areas on the southern periphery of the Bloc or in the southern portion of the Western Hemisphere.

96. Without assessing these systems, or the desirability of using multiple modes of detection and observation, it appears that several of the intelligence and warning systems now under development can be most effectively employed from overseas sites, or could be employed earlier in their development cycle if such sites are available. The utility of overseas based intelligence systems is not necessarily limited to a peacetime environment. One of the most difficult general war problems is considered to be that of gaining timely and accurate knowledge of both the performance of our own weapons and the location of those that remain available to the enemy. It is possible that overseas-based systems or vehicles would be of utility in such post-strike reconnaissance, particularly if they are not collocated with deployed nuclear strike systems or other U.S. forces overseas.

#### Space Operations

97. Indirectly related to the strategic mission area are those military requirements for overseas bases to support space operations

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in command, communications, R&D, testing and tracking functions. Major additions to U.S. base requirements in this area are likely to include extension of the Atlantic missile range possibly through sites in the African and Indian Ocean areas, and a landing site and other support facilities in South America for the DYNASOAR test program. Several of the earth satellite systems now under development, [REDACTED] envisage ground readout stations and other support facilities on overseas territory.

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